Add to ORKGIn this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by capacities. It is shown that, if each agent's information partition is made up of unambiguous events in the sense of Nehring (1999, Mat. Soc. Sci. 38, 197-213), then it is impossible that the agents disagree on their commonly known decisions, whatever these decisions are : whether posterior beliefs or conditional expectations. Conversely, an agreement on conditional expectations, but not on posterior beliefs, implies that agents' private information must c...
We develop a framework that allows us to reproduce the generalised agreement theorem of Samet (2010)...
We develop a framework that allows us to emulate standard results from the “agreeing to disagree" li...
A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented b...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
In this paper we characterize conditions under which it is impossible that non-Bayesian agents “agre...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
ABSTRACT. Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to co...
The robustness of Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is ...
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an ...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by cond...
Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""li...
We develop a framework that allows us to reproduce the generalised agreement theorem of Samet (2010)...
We develop a framework that allows us to emulate standard results from the “agreeing to disagree" li...
A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented b...
In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can ...
In this paper we characterize conditions under which it is impossible that non-Bayesian agents “agre...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
ABSTRACT. Consider two agents who want to be Bayesians with a common prior, but who cannot due to co...
The robustness of Aumann’s seminal agreement theorem with respect to the common prior assumption is ...
We study a setting where Bayesian agents with a common prior have private information related to an ...
Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpr...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individual...
In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by cond...
Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two ""li...
We develop a framework that allows us to reproduce the generalised agreement theorem of Samet (2010)...
We develop a framework that allows us to emulate standard results from the “agreeing to disagree" li...
A decision-maker is said to have an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented b...